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LICENSES AND THE UNIFORM
COMPUTER INFORMATION
TRANSACTIONS ACT
CHEON-SEOK SEO
INTRODUCTION
According to Black's Law Dictionary, a "license" is "a revocable
permission to commit some act that would otherwise be unlawful," 1
while "licensing" is defined as "the sale of a license authorizing an-
other to use something (such as computer software) protected by
copyright, patent, or trademark."' 2 The Uniform Computer Informa-
tion Transactions Act ("UCITA" or "Act") defines the term-a li-
cense-more specifically as "a contract that authorizes access to, or
use, distribution, performance, modification, or reproduction of, infor-
mation or informational rights, but expressly limits the access or uses
authorized or expressly 'grants fewer than all rights in the information,
whether or not the transferee has title to a licensed copy."'3 Therefore,
a license is "an agreement the terms of which entail a limited or condi-
tional transfer of information or a grant of limited or restricted con-
tractual rights or permissions to use information."'4
Whether a contract is a license does not depend on whether the
contract transfers title to, or ownership of, a copy.5 Ownership of, or
title to, a copy is distinguished from ownership of intellectual property
rights. 6 While obtaining ownership of a copy may give the copy owner
some rights with respect to that copy, it does not convey ownership of
the underlying intellectual property rights in a work of authorship, a
patented invention, or other intellectual property.7
1 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999).
2 Id.
3 UCITA § 102(a)(40). The term includes an access contract, a lease of a computer
program, and a consignment of a copy. The term does not include a reservation or creation
of a security interest to the extent the interest is governed by Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code ("UCC").
4 UCITA § 102 Official Comments 36. A contract "right" is an affirmative commit-
ment that a licensee may engage in a specific use, while a contract "permission" means
simply that the licensor will not object to the use.
5 Id.
6 See DSC v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Such distinc-
tion is fundamental in intellectual property law and made explicit in the Copyright Act and
other law.
7 Under federal law, a sale of a copy of a copyrighted work does not give the copy
owner a number of rights that he or she may desire.
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In conclusion, a license exists (1) if a contract grants greater
rights or privileges than a first sale,8 (2) if it restricts rights or privi-
leges that might otherwise exist, or (3) if it deals with other issues of
scope of use.
"Shrinkwrap" is the common term for the transparent plastic or
cellophane wrapping that seals boxes of mass-marketed software. 9 Ac-
cording to Black's Law Dictionary again, a "shrinkwrap license" is "a
printed license that is displayed on the outside of a software package
and that advises the buyer that by opening the package, the buyer
becomes legally obligated to abide by the terms of the license." 10 The
UCITA defines the term-a mass-market license-as "a standard
form used in a mass-market transaction,"" and it includes all con-
sumer contracts and also includes some transactions between busi-
nesses if they are in a retail market.12 Shrinkwrap licenses usually seek
to: (1) prohibit users from making unauthorized copies of the
software; (2) prohibit modifications to the software; (3) limit use of
the software to one computer; (4) limit the manufacturer's liability
(i.e., limit a purchaser's remedies to repair and replacement of defec-
8 The "first sale" doctrine provides that "the owner of a particular copy ... lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the
authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that
particular copy .. " See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a).
9 See Frank J. Pita, Practitioner's Corner: Reconciling Reverse Engineering and Con-
flicting Shrinkwrap License Terms Under U.C.C. Article 2B: A Patent Law Solution, 14
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 465, 465 (June 1998).
10 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). Software vendors typically attach written
end user agreements to the shrinkwrap; hence, the term shrinkwrap licenses grew to re-
present the licenses themselves, even when these licenses appear on a computer screen
instead of a box. See Pita, supra note 9, at 465. "Clickwrap" licenses are the electronic
equivalent of shrinkwrap licenses. See Charles R. McManis, The Privatization (or "Shrink-
Wrapping") of American Copyright Law, 87 CAL. L. REV. 173, 173 (1999). This type of
license appears on a user's computer screen when the user first loads a computer program,
and requires the user to "click" his acceptance of the terms of the license before he uses
the software. See Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital
Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1058 (1998). Both types of licenses will be referred to
herein as "shrinkwrap licenses."
11 UCITA § 102(a)(43). "Mass-market transaction" means "a transaction that is: (A) a
consumer contract; or (B) any other transaction with an end-user licensee if: (i) the trans-
action is for information or informational rights directed to the general public as a whole,
including consumers, under substantially the same terms for the same information; (ii) the
licensee acquires the information or informational rights in a retail transaction under terms
and in a quantity consistent with an ordinary transaction in a retail market; and (iii) the
transaction is not: (I) a contract for redistribution or for public performance or public
display of a copyrighted work; (II) a transaction in which the information is customized or
otherwise specially prepared by the licensor for the licensee, other than minor customiza-
tion using a capability of the information intended for that purpose; (III) a site license; or
(IV) an access contract." Id. § 102(a)(44).
12 UCITA § 102 Official Comments 38. The term "mass market license" is new and the
definition must be applied in light of its intended and limited function.
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tive disks); and (5) disclaim all warranties (other than physical defects
in the disks). 13 Traditionally U.S. courts have often refused to enforce
terms of standard forms that are presented to customers only after a
sale. 14 However, a recent court held software shrinkwrap licenses
valid under the current UCC Article 2 on sales of goods. 15 Now, con-
tract law, in the form of shrinkwrap license agreements, is the most
popular method of protecting mass marketed software. 16
I.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION
OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE
A. Copyright Protection for Computer Software
Copyright protection for software arrived in 1980, when Congress
specifically amended § 101 of the Copyright Act 17 to protect computer
programs, as evidenced by the inclusion of a definition of "computer
program." Copyright law protects the original expression of software
ideas from being copied, but not any ideas, processes, or functions
contained in the software.' 8 Also, software must be fixed in some tan-
gible medium in order to be protected. 19 If the statutory requirements
for copyright protection are satisfied, a software developer can copy,
sell, modify, distribute, display, or perform the software creations.20 A
significant limitation of copyright, however, is that ownership of a
valid copyright in a work does not foreclose the independent creation
of that work by someone else.21 In addition, copyright could be re-
13 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999); Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property
and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1246 (1995) [hereinafter "Lemely,
Shrinkwrap Licenses."] For an example of a typical shrinkwrap license, see Vault Corp. v.
Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 257 n.2 (5th Cir. 1988).
14 See Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology, 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991)
(despite his conduct in continuing with the shrinkwrap agreement, the buyer never ex-
pressly assented to the license agreement); Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link,
Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993) (warranty disclaimer clause in license agreement was
not enforceable).
15 ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
16 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1239,1246 (July, 1995); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1148 (7th Cir. 1997)
(commercial transactions in which people pay for products with terms to follow are
enforceable).
17 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-1101 ("Copyright Act"). See Apple Com-
puter, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1247-48 (3d Cir. 1983).
18 Id. § 102(a)-(b).
19 Id. § 102(a).
20 Id. § 106.
21 See, e.g., Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 F.2d 1090, 1092 n.2 (2d
Cir. 1977).
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stricted by fair use doctrine22 under which reverse engineering will be
permitted if there is a legitimate reason for reverse engineering and it
is the sole method of gaining access to the ideas and functional ele-
ments embodied in a computer program. 23
B. Patent Protection for Computer Software
Patents are the most recent means of protecting software intellectual
property.2 4 Since almost the inception of our patent system, inventors
and their counsel have been testing the limits of what they can claim
relative to what they have disclosed.25 The same issues as in Morse,
where the Supreme Court was concerned about too broad a claim of
Morse's, came to a head in a series of the Court's decisions over a
decade beginning in the early 1970s. In the trilogy of decisions, Gott-
schalk v. Benson,26 Parker v. Flook,27 and Diamond v. Diehr,28 the
Court established that an algorithm or computer program, as such, is
not statutory subject matter and is therefore unpatentable. 29
By about 1994, the CAFC and its predecessor court established a
set of criteria30 that distinguished statutory subject matter from non-
statutory subject matter for computer program-related inventions. In
the case of an apparatus, the apparatus was statutory subject matter if
the algorithm/computer program was carried out in a computer inter-
connected to other machinery or devicesat the input end of the whole
claimed system.3' A claim considered to be directed to an algorithm,
as such, however, without adequate apparatus trimmings, was unpat-
entable. In the case of a process, a claim would cover statutory subject
22 For the statutory foundation of the fair use doctrine, see 17 U.S.C. § 107. The statute
requires a consideration of four factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work.
23 See Anthony J. Mahajan, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering
After ProCD: A Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REV.
3297, 3307 (1999).
24 See Frank J. Pita, Reconciling Reverse Engineering and Conflicting Shrinkwrap Li-
cense Terms Under U.C.C. Article 2B: A Patent Law Solution, 14 COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 465, 469 (1998).
25 See, e.g., O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 62 (1853). See also Robert P. Merges,
Peter S Menell, Mark A. Lemley & Thomas M. Jorde, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE (1997) at 152.
26 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
27 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
28 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
29 An algorithm is a process in the ordinary sense of that word, but it is not the kind of
process that the statute makes patentable. Flook, 437 U.S. at 593.
30 This is generally called the Freeman-Walter-Abele test.
31 See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
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matter if it (i) was limited to a specific apparatus environment, (ii)
involved the transformation of one substance into another, or (iii) in-
volved the manipulation and transformation of electrical signals rep-
resentative of physical parameters (e.g., temperature, pH, reflected
seismic energy, cardiac muscle electropotential). 32 If the claim did
none of those things, the process was unpatentable as nonstatutory
subject matter. 33
In 1994, the Freeman-Walter-Abele test abruptly became of little
use in the wake of the en banc CAFC's Alappat decision.34 The major-
ity opinion in Alappat could be interpreted as holding that a newly
programmed general-purpose digital computer, without more, is statu-
tory subject matter as a "machine. '35 Interpreted liberally, Alappat
and its progeny suggest that even functional software operating in
connection with a general purpose computer can constitute a patenta-
ble "machine." In recent years, patent protection has become increas-
ingly available to computer programs.36 As computer programs begin
to receive both patent and copyright protection, the traditional dis-
tinction between patent and copyright law-that patent law protects
functional innovations while copyright law eschews protection of func-
tional works37-has eroded with reference to computer programs be-
cause Congress has carved out an exception for computer programs
under copyright. 38
While copyright law generally eschews protection of functional
works, however, patent law protects only those works that are func-
tional.39 Further, while copyright law creates limited monopoly rights
in original expression but does not prohibit others from using the
ideas or knowledge expressed therein, the holder of a patent is
granted the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
32 See In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
33 See id.
34 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
35 The majority held that "such programming creates a new machine, because a general
purpose computer in effect becomes a special purpose computer once it is programmed to
perform particular functions pursuant to instructions from program software." 33 F.3d at
1545 (citing In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1247 n.11 (C.C.P.A. 1978); In re Noll, 545 F.2d
141, 148 (C.C.P.A. 1976); and In re Prater, 415 F.2d at 1403 (C.C.P.A. 1969)).
36 See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 255, 259 (1997).
37 Dennis J. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of
Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 41-42 (1998).
38 Vincent Chiappetta, Patentability of Computer Software Instruction as an "Article of
Manufacture": Software as Such as the Right Stuff, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO.
L. 89, 100 (1998).
39 See Karjala, supra note 37, at 41-42.
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those ideas functionally embodied by the patent.40 Finally, patent law,
unlike copyright law, protects against subsequent independent
inventors. 41
C. Trade Secret Protection for Computer Software
Common law trade secret doctrines may also protect proprietary
rights in computer programs.42 A trade secret is any information, in-
cluding computer programs, processes, or devices, that derives eco-
nomic value from not being generally known to others.43 Trade secrets
provide fragile but potentially eternal software protection for
software, provided secrecy is maintained. 44 To preserve a trade secret,
its holder must take reasonable steps to maintain secrecy.45 Trade
secrets terminate and become public domain information if publicly
disclosed, for any reason.46 Reverse engineering and independent dis-
covery have been held legally viable means of ending another's trade
secret, which of course impacts any trade secret material contained in
software. 47
Trade secret law may be held preempted by § 301 of the Copy-
right Act if it proscribes conduct equivalent to that prohibited by
copyright law.48 If preemption occurs, redress under state trade secret
40 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (One who, without authority, "makes, uses or sells any patented
invention" infringes a patent.).
41 See David Bender & Anthony R. Barkume, Patents for Software-Related Inventions,
5 SOFTWARE L.J. 279, 287 (1992).
42 Anthony J. Mahajan, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering After
ProCD: A Proposed Compromise For Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3297,
3307 (May, 1999), citing Softel, Inc. v. Dragon Med. & Scientific Communications, Inc., 118
F.3d 955, 968 (2d Cir. 1997), Rivendell Forest Prod., Ltd. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 28 F.3d
1042, 1045 (10th Cir. 1994), and Harbor Software, Inc. v. Applied Sys., Inc., 887 F. Supp.
86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). Unlike federal patent and copyright protection, trade secrets are a
creation of state law.
43 Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1985). States that have not adopted the Uniform Trade
Secrets Act, including New York, generally look to the first Restatement of Torts when
defining a trade secret. See Softel, 118 F.3d at 968. The Restatement defines a trade secret
as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used in one's busi-
ness, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over competitors who do
not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b. (1939).
44 See Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1 (1985).
45 See Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 848 (10th Cir.
1993).
46 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 475-76 (1974).
47 See id. at 490.
48 See Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 716 (2d Cir. 1992). Sec-
tion 301 provides, in pertinent part, that "nothing in this title annuls or limits any rights or
remedies under the common law or statutes of any State with respect to . . . activities
violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106." 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)
(1994). The patent laws do not contain an express preemption section and state trade se-
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laws will be foreclosed. 49 Copyright preemption of trade secret claims,
however, may be avoided through the use of contractual agreements,
popularly known as "shrinkwrap licenses. '50
D. Contract Protection for Computer Software
Early in the history of computer software development, a ques-
tion existed regarding whether software was protectable under copy-
right, patent, or trade secret law. 51 Congress did not amend the
Copyright Act to explicitly include computer programs until 1980, and
patent protection for certain types of software was not accepted by the
courts until 1994. To combat this uncertainty, computer software man-
ufacturers, perceiving that intellectual property protection was lack-
ing, devised "shrinkwrap licenses" to obtain the necessary proprietary
protection for their products.52 The license terms most often prohibit
the licensee from transferring, sublicensing, renting, leasing, convey-
ing, copying, modifying, translating, converting to another program-
ming language, or reverse engineering the software. 53 These contracts
enable computer software manufacturers to protect material, includ-
ing ideas, processes, and systems, that might otherwise be unpro-
tected.5 4 However, shrinkwrap licenses were routinely held
unenforceable until the Seventh Circuit's recent holding in ProCD,
Inc. v. Zeidenberg.
II.
THE PRoCD COURT'S ANALYSIS OF
SHRINKWRAP LICENSES
A. History of the Case
The defendant, Matthew Zeidenberg, had purchased a copy of
ProCD's Select Phone computer program and database containing
over 95,000,000 phone listings compiled from approximately 3,000
public telephone books.55 The Select Phone program was sold subject
cret laws may coexist with the federal patent laws. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,
416 U.S. 470, 478-79 (1974).
49 See Altai, 982 F.2d at 716-17.
50 See, e.g., Mahajan, supra note 42, at 3309.
51 See Stephen Fraser, Canada-United States Trade Issues: Back from Purgatory? Why
Computer Software "Shrink-Wrap" Licenses Should Be Laid to Rest, 6 TUL. J. INT'L &
CoMP. L. 183, 189 (1998).
52 See Thomas M.S. Hemnes, Restraints on Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the
Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENv. U. L. REv. 577, 578-80 (1994).
53 See Lemley, Shrinkwrap Licenses, supra note 13, at 1246.
54 See Madison, supra note 10, at 1029 n. 11.
55 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644-45 (W.D. Wis.), rev'd, 86 F.3d
1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
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to a shrinkwrap license that prohibited the purchaser from making
"the Software or the Listings in whole or in part available to any other
user in any networked or time-shared environment, or transferring the
Listings in whole or in part to any computer other than the computer
used to access the Listings. ' 56 In violation of this provision,
Zeidenberg extracted the phone listings from the Select Phone pro-
gram, included them in his own database program, and made the
package available on his company's website on the Internet.57 ProCD
then sued Zeidenberg and his company, Silken Mountain Web Ser-
vices, for copyright infringement, breach of the license agreement, and
unfair competition. 58
The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, holding that Zeidenberg's use of ProCD's computer pro-
gram fell within § 117 of the Copyright Act because Zeidenberg used
ProCD's program only to access the data supplied by ProCD.59 Al-
though the Select Phone program was within the scope of the Copy-
right Act as a compilation of facts, according to the court, the
telephone and address data contained therein were not copyrightable
because they were not sufficiently original.60 The court also held that
the shrinkwrap license was not breached because the defendants had
not assented to its terms, 61 and that even if the license were enforcea-
ble, the agreement was "preempted by federal copyright law to the
extent plaintiff intended it to apply to uncopyrightable data." 62
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Easterbrook, re-
versed the district court.63 After finding shrinkwrap licenses generally
enforceable, 64 the court held that § 301 of the Copyright Act did not
preempt their enforcement. 65 In so holding, the court drew a distinc-
tion between the rights conferred by copyright, which are enforceable
56 See id. at 645.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 644.
59 See id. at 649-50. Section 117 provides, in pertinent part: It is not an infringement for
the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making of another
copy or adaptation of that computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adap-
tation is created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in conjunc-
tion with a machine and that it is used in no other manner. 17 U.S.C. § 117.
60 See id. at 656-57. The Supreme Court, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone
Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991), reiterated that copyright will only be afforded those
works that satisfy the constitutionally mandated standard of originality. See id. at 347-48.
The Supreme Court further stated that it is a well-established proposition that facts, such
as the phone and address listings in ProCD, and ideas are not copyrightable. See id. at 344.
61 See ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 644.
62 See id.
63 See ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449.
64 See id. at 1452-53.
65 See id. at 1454-55.
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rights against the entire world regardless of the existence of an agree-
ment, and rights created by contract, the enforceability of which de-
pend on proof of a contractual agreement. 66 According to the Seventh
Circuit, § 301 does not interfere with private transactions in intellec-
tual property;67 thus, private parties are free to set up between them-
selves controlling rights and restrictions that are not equivalent to any
of the exclusive rights within the scope of copyright.68
B. Effects of ProCD on Article 2B and the UCITA
Courts and commentators have generally accepted ProCD as
confirmation that shrinkwrap licenses are now enforceable. 69 ProCD
foreshadows the approach under the proposed revisions to Article 2
of the UCC. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws ("NCCUSL") has begun to revise the current version of
Article 2. And the drafters of the UCITA also have adopted the posi-
tion that shrinkwrap licenses are valid. Now § 209 of the UCITA
would reverse Step-Saver70 and would establish specific rules gov-
erning the enforceability of mass-market licenses, including shrink-
wrap licenses.71
III.
OVERVIEW OF THE UCITA
A. History of the UCITA
In 1994, the NCCUSL, in conjunction with the American Law
Institute ("ALI"), began work on an addition to the UCC, Article 2B,
that would address the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses. 72 During
66 See id.
67 The Seventh Circuit stated that a copyright is a right against the world. Contracts, by
contrast, generally affect only their parties; strangers may do as they please, so contracts do
not create exclusive rights. See id. at 1454.
68 See id. at 1455.
69 See, e.g., Expediters Int'l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Management Servs.,
Inc., 995 F. Supp. 468, 483 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that a contract claim is not equivalent to
rights under copyright law because a promise is required); Lattie v. Murdach, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1240, 1244 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (concluding that a contract claim is not
equivalent to exclusive copyright rights); Architectronics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc., 935 F.
Supp. 425, 438-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that the consensus among courts and com-
mentators is that breach of contract claims are not preempted by the Copyright Act);
Madison, supra note 10, at 1053 & n.104 (citing commentators).
70 See ProCD, supra note 15.
71 Under section 209, "a party adopts the terms of a mass-market license... if the party
agrees to that license, such as by manifesting assent, before or during the party's initial
performance or use of or access to the information." UCITA § 209(a).
72 See NCCUSL and ALl Announce Schedule for Completion of Uniform Commercial
Code Article 2B-Licensing, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/library/ucl/ucc2b/
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the drafting process, however, Article 2B came under heavy criticism
from consumer groups,73 governmental agencies, 74 industry groups,75
academics, 76 and even members of the drafting committee itself.77
Thus, in April 1999, the ALI withdrew its support for the fledgling
legislation. Without support from ALI, the legislation could not be
proposed to state legislatures as an addition to the UCC; nevertheless,
the NCCUSL continues to advocate the legislation's adoption. The
NCCUSL changed the name from Article 2B to UCITA and has re-
tained the text of Article 2B almost verbatim.78 UCITA received NC-
CUSL's final approval by a 43-6 state count on July 29, 1999. Virginia
was the first state to pass the UCITA into law, on March 14, 2000
(effective as of July 1, 2001) and the second was Maryland, on April
25, 2000 (effective as of October 1, 2000). And the Act has been intro-
2breleas.htm. For the detailed analysis of why Article 2 cannot apply to computer informa-
tion transactions, see Lorin Brennan, Symposium on Approaching E-Commerce Through
Uniform Legislation; Understanding the Uniform Computer Information Act and the Uni-
form Electronic Transactions Act: Why Article 2 Cannot Apply to Software Transactions, 38
Duo. L. REV. 459 (Winter 2000).
73 See, e.g., Letter from Gail Hillebrand, Consumers Union, to Uniform Law Commis-
sioner at http://www.2bguide.com/docs/cu699.html (visited June 21, 1999); Letter from
Ralph Nader to Uniform Law Commissioners at http://www.cptech.org/ucc/nader2.html
(last visited July 18, 1997).
74 Government critics include 24 state attorneys general and the FTC. See Letter from
State Attorneys General to Gene Lebrun, President, NCCUSL (July 23, 1999) at http://
www.2Bguide.com/docs/799ags.html; Letter from State Attorneys General to Gene
Lebrun, NCCUSL (July 28, 1999), available at http://www.2Bguide.com/docs/
799mags.html; Letter from Staff of the FTC to John L. McClaugherty, Chairman, Execu-
tive Committee, NCCUSL (July 9, 1999) at http://www.ftc.gov/be/v990010.htm.
75 Examples include the Motion Picture Association of America Inc., Recording Indus-
try Association of America Inc., Newspaper Association of America, National Association
of Broadcasters, National Cable Television Association, and Magazine Publishers of
America. See Letter from Jack Valenti, Motion Picture Association of America, et al., to
John McClaugherty, President-Elect, NCCUSL (May 10, 1999) at http://www.2bguide.com/
docs/coalit5.html.
76 See generally Symposium, Intellectual Property and Contract Law in the Information
Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Transac-
tions in Information and Electronic Commerce, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 809 (1998); Intel-
lectual Property and Contract Law for the Information Age: The Impact of Article 2B of the
Uniform Commercial Code on the Future of Information Commerce, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1
(1999); George A. Cooke, Jr., Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, Practi-
tioner Issues Outline, 631 PLI/Pat 1149, 1160-63 (January 2001). For the detailed opinion
against the UCITA, see Cem Kaner, Why You Should Oppose UCITA, 17 No. 5 COM-
PUTER LAW 20 (May 2000).
77 See Bad Software: What to Do when Software Fails (last modified July 22, 1999) at
http://www.badsoftware.com/oppose.htm.
78 The current UCITA provisions are almost the same as the proposed Article 2B of
the UCC. Compare § 209 of the February 2000 version of the UCITA with § 2B-208 of the
February 1999 version of the Proposed Article 2B. At http://www.law.upenn.edufbll/ulc.
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duced in jurisdictions such as Delaware, District, of Columbia, and
Oklahoma.79
B. Scope of the Act
The Act applies to "computer information transactions,' 80 and
deals with contracts and not property law,81 despite much grander am-
bitions in its earlier Article 2B form.82 The Act governs agreements
pertaining to computer information on matters addressed by contract
law.83 Unlike a buyer of goods, the purchaser of computer informa-
tion has little interest in the diskette originally containing the informa-
tion after the information is loaded into a computer, unless the
information remains on that medium and nowhere else.84 However,
the mere fact that communications about a transaction, such as an ap-
plication for a loan or employment, are sent or recorded in digital
form does not place the transaction within this Act.85 Examples of
transactions within the Act are contracts to create or develop com-
puter information, 86 computer programs,87 access and internet con-
tracts,88 digital multimedia works, 89 and data processing contracts. 90
79 For the updated news about UCITA legislation, see UCITA Online at http://
www.ucitaonline.com/whatsnu.html (last modified Mar. 14, 2000). For the detailed analysis
of the first state legislation of the UCITA in Virginia, see Scott J. Spooner, The Validation
of Shrink-Wrap and Click-Wrap Licenses by Virginia's Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, 7 RiCH. J.L. & TECH. sd27 (Winter 2001).
80 UCITA § 102(a)(11).
81 UCITA § 103 Official Comments 2.
82 The original scope of the proposed uniform law was "digital information." Later,
responding to obvious convergence in information industries and the increasing relevance
of digital technology, the project expanded to cover "all transactions involving informa-
tion, electronic and non-electronic." See National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B - Licenses (last modified Oct. 21,
1999), http://www.law.upenn.edu/b11/ucc/ucc2b/26898.htm. However, objections by various
media industries forced the Committee to scale back UCITA's reach to computer informa-
tion transactions only.
83 "Computer information" is information in a form directly capable of being processed
by, or obtained from, a computer and any copy, associated documentation, or packaging.
UCITA § 102(a)(10).
84 UCITA § 103 Official Comments 2. In online use and distribution of computer infor-
mation, there is often no tangible medium at all.
85 Examples are a contract for airplane transportation, a contract to create and publish
a print book, an insurance policy prepared in digital form, and a contract for a digital
signature certificate.
86 UCITA § 103 Official Comments 2.a.
87 Id. at 2.b.
88 Id. at 2.c.
89 Id. at 2.d.
90 Id. at 2.e.
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C. Transactions Outside the Act
The scope of the UCITA is limited by the affirmative definitions
of "computer information" and "computer information transaction,"
which exclude print and various other forms of information distribu-
tion, as well as by exclusions stated in subsection (d). 91
Excluded from the UCITA are core financial functions such as
core banking, payment, and financial services activities. 92 Also ex-
cluded are core entertainment; cable, and broadcast. 93 The UCITA
excludes compulsory licenses provided pursuant to the Copyright Act
and similar statutes. 94
D. Mixed Transactions
1. Computer Information and UCC Subject Matter.
If a transaction includes computer information and subject matter
governed by an article of the UCC (e.g., a computer and software),
the general rule is that, in the absence of contrary agreement under
§ 104, the rules of the UCC apply to its subject matter and the provi-
sions of the Act apply to its subject matter.95 If there is a conflict be-
tween a provision of the Act and Article 9 of the UCC, Article 9
prevails. 96
91 UCITA § 103 Official Comments 3. As a result, the Act leaves unaffected all transac-
tions in the traditional core businesses of non-digital information industries (e.g., print). Id.
Whether a magazine, book, or newspaper publisher can contractually limit use of the infor-
mation by purchasers of copies and what contract liability applies to print works is outside
this Act, as are the following: sales or leases of goods; personal services contracts (except
computer information development and support agreements); casual exchanges of infor-
mation; contracts where computer information is not required; employment contracts; con-
tracts where computer information is insignificant (de minimus); computers, televisions,
VCRs, DVD players, or similar goods; financial services transactions; contracts for print
books, magazines, or newspapers; contracts for sound recordings and musical works; and
contracts for motion pictures, broadcast or cable programming outside the mass market.
Id.
92 UCITA § 103(d)(1). Financial services transactions are similar in many ways to com-
puter information transactions. UCITA § 103 Official Comments 5.a. They share some
common legal issues: e.g., (1) authenticity, (2) data integrity, and (3) authority. Id. How-
ever, the digital subject matter of a financial transaction is the value it represents. Id.
93 UCITA § 103(d)(2).
94 UCITA § 103 Official Comments 5.c. Compulsory licenses are not voluntary contrac-
tual relationships and the contract choice principles which underlie the UCITA are not
appropriate. Id.
95 UCITA § 103 Official Comments 4.a.
96 Id.
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2. Computer Information and Goods Generally.
Generally, the terms do not overlap since computer information
and informational rights are not goods.97 If there is a diskette, the
diskette is a tangible object but the information on the diskette does
not become goods simply because it is contained on a tangible me-
dium, any more than the information in a book is governed by the law
of goods because the book binding and paper may be Article 2
goods.98
3. Computer Information and Goods: Exceptions to General Rule.
In contrast, in some cases; the Act excludes coverage of a copy of
a computer program if the copy is embedded in and sold or leased as
part of (inseparable from) goods, such as a copy of a computer pro-
gram that controls engine timing in a car.99 For contract law, the ap-
propriate rules center on the nature of the goods containing the copy
and on the importance of the program and access to it in the transac-
tion in those goods.100
4. Computer Information and Subject Matter not within the UCC.
The Act ordinarily applies only to its own subject matter, but not
to aspects involving the other subject matter unless the computer in-
formation is the primary purpose of the agreement.10
E. Mass-Market Licenses
UCITA validates shrinkwrap licenses if three criteria are met.
First, the licensee must have reason to know that additional contract
terms will be proposed after the initial agreement.10 2 Second, she
must be given the right to return the product at the licensor's cost. 103
Finally, the licensee must be compensated for reasonable costs of re-
97 Id. at. 4.b. See also United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109 (7th Cir. 1998); Fink v.
DeClassis, 745 F. Supp. 509, 515 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (trademarks, tradenames, advertising,
artwork, customer lists, sales records, unfulfilled sales orders, goodwill, and licenses are not
"goods").
98 See, e.g., Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991); Grappo v.
Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, 56 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 1995); Gilmer v. Buena Vista Home
Video, Inc., 939 F Supp 665 (W.D. Ark. 1996); Architectonics, Inc. v. Control Systems, Inc.,
935 F. Supp 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Cardozo v. True, 342 So.2d 1053 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
99 UCITA § 103 Official Comments 4.c (1999).
100 Id.
101 Id. at 4.d.
102 See UCITA § 208(2).
103 See id. § 209(b), § 209 Official Comments 5.b.
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storing the system if it is altered by the installation of license terms for
review. 104
1. General Rules: Freedom of Contracts with the Three Limiting
Concepts.
Assent and agreement. Under UCITA, mass-market licenses are
typically enforceable only if the licensee manifests assent to the con-
tract after having an opportunity to review its terms.1 05 A party adopts
the terms of a record that is a mass-market license only if it agrees to
the record, by manifesting assent or otherwise. 10 6 A party cannot do
so unless it has an opportunity to review the record before it agrees.10 7
This means that the record must be available for review and called to
the person's attention in a manner such that a reasonable person
ought to have noticed it.108 Unconscionability and fundamental public
policy. Furthermore, mass-market license terms are limited by uncon-
scionability and fundamental public policy. 10 9 Even if a party adopts
terms of a mass market license, a court may invalidate unconscionable
terms or terms against fundamental public policy. 110 Conflict with ex-
pressly agreed terms. Standard terms in a mass-market license cannot
alter the terms expressly agreed between the parties to the license."'
2. Terms Prior to Payment.
If a mass-market license is presented before the price is paid, this
Act follows general law that enforces a standard form contract if the
party assents to it.112 The fact that license terms are non-negotiable or
that the contract may constitute a "contract of adhesion" does not
invalidate it under general contract law or the Act.113 A conclusion
that a contract is a contract of adhesion may, however, require that
courts take a closer* look at contract terms to prevent
unconscionability.114
104 See id. § 209(b)(2).
105 See UCITA § 209(b).
106 UCITA § 209 Official Comments 2.a (1999).
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 See id. §§ 105(b), 209(a)(1).
110 See id.
Ill See UCITA § 209(a)(2).
112 UCITA § 209 Official Comments 4 (1999).
113 Id.
114 Id., citing, e.g., Klos v. Polske Linie Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 1997); Fireman's
Fund Insurance v. M.V. DSR Atlantic, 131 F.3d 1336 (9th Cir. 1998); Chan v. Adventurer
Cruises, Inc., 123 F.3d 1287 (9th Cir. 1997).
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3. Terms after Initial Agreement.
Layered contracting. The Act adopts the ProCD rule widely fol-
lowed in cases that recognize the commercial reality that contracts are
often formed over time. 115 Timing of assent. Under the Act, agree-
ment to the mass-market record must occur no later than during the
initial use of the information. 116 Assent to terms of a contract is differ-
ent from acceptance of the copy to which the contract pertains."l 7 Ac-
ceptance of the copy generally requires a prior right to inspect it.118
Cost Free Return. If terms are not available until after initial agree-
ment, the party being asked to assent must have a right to reject terms
with a commensurate right to a return of the information product ac-
quired.119 The Act refers to a return right, rather than a right to a
refund. 120
F. Warranties
UCITA adopts several existing warranties from UCC Article 2121
and creates new warranties specific to computer information. 122 How-
ever, subtle differences in the computer information context give rise
to some concerns for licensees. First, UCITA permits licensors to dis-
claim the implied warranties as long as such a disclaimer is "conspicu-
115 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Brower v. Gateway
2000, Inc., 676 NYS.2d 569 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); M.A. Mortenson Co., Inc. v. Timberline
Software Corp., 970 P.2d 803 (Wash. App. 1999).
116 UCITA § 209 Official Comments 5.a (1999).
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 5.b.
120 Id.
121 See UCC § 2-312 (Warranty of Title and Against Infringement); § 2-313 (Express
Warranties by Affirmation); § 2-314 (Implied Warranty: Merchantability); and § 2-315 (Im-
plied Warranty: Fitness for a Particular Purpose).
122 UCITA warranties, analogous or new to Article 2, are § 401 (creating warranty of
noninfringement and substituting Article 2's warranty of title with warranty of quiet enjoy-
ment); § 402 (providing similar standard for creation of express warranties as Article 2 and
explicitly adding advertising as basis for such warranty); § 403 (creating implied warranty
of merchantability for computer programs but specifically excluding informational con-
tent); and § 405 (providing similar implied warranty that product will meet reasonably
known needs of licensee as in Article 2 but adding qualifications for published informa-
tional content). For the detailed analysis of warranties of the UCITA, see Matthew J.
Smith, An Overview of the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: Warranties,
Self-Help, and Contract Formation, Why the UCITA Should Be Renamed "The Licensors'
Protection Act," 25 S. ILL. U. L. J. 389, 400-078 (Winter 2001); Mary Jo Howard Dively,
The UCITA Revolution: The New E-Commerce Model for Software and Database Licens-
ing: Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act: Warranties, Disclaimers and Reme-
dies, 600 PLI/Pat 491 (April-May 2000).
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ous."'1 23 The second consumer protection problem is that UCITA's
implied warranty on accuracy of informational content does not cover
"published informational content. ' 124
G. Electronic Self-help and Right to Possession and to Prevent Use
"Self-help" under the UCITA means "the right of software ven-
dors to remotely disable a customer's software if the customer is in
default of his contract with them,"1125 while the term is generally de-
fined as "the right to reclaim possession of secured collateral from a
debtor for a material breach of an agreement without resorting to the
judicial process."' 26 Furthermore, while the UCC generally does not
require notice to the debtor upon self-help repossession of the collat-
123 See UCITA § 406(b)(1)(A)(1999). However, § 406(c), which supercedes the condi-
tions for disclaimer set forth in § 406(b), makes no mention of the "conspicuous" require-
ment and provides that licensors may simply use expressions like "as is" or "with all faults"
to disclaim all implied warranties. Id. § 406(b)-(c). Furthermore, the Act allows for dis-
claimer of implied warranties by "usage of trade." Id. § 406(e).
124 See id. 404(b)(1). UCITA defines "published informational content" as "informa-
tional content prepared for or made available to recipients generally, or to a class of recipi-
ents, in substantially the same form," as opposed to a personally-tailored service. Id.
102(a)(51). Examples of published informational content include the content of digital
newsletters, multimedia encyclopedias, and on-line databases. Pratik A. Shah, Berkeley
Technology Law Journal Annual Review Of Law And Technology, I. Intellectual Prop-
erty; A. Copyright: The Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 15 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 85, 95 (2000). Courts have recognized that this class of digital information de-
serves the same protection as its counterpart in the traditional print media, which the
courts shield from normal tort liability. See UCITA § 404 Official Comments 3.b (1999),
citing Cubby, Inc. v. CompuServ, Inc., 3 CCH Computer Cases 46, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1991);
Daniel v. Dow Jones & Co., Inc., 520 N.Y.S.2d 334 (N.Y. City Ct. 1987); Great Central
Insurance Co. v. Insurance Services Office, Inc., 74 F.3d 778 (7th Cir. 1997) (no implied
warranty of accuracy). For the detailed analysis of the concerns regarding the distinction
between computer programs and informational content, see Katy Hull, The Overlooked
Concern with the Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act, 51 HAS-INGs L. J.
1391, 1402-03 (August 2000), citing Michele C. Kane, When Is a Computer Program Not a
Computer Program? The Perplexing World Created by Proposed U.C.C. Article 2B, 13
BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1013, 1013 (1998).
125 See id. §§ 815, 816. The aggrieved party has a right to recover the licensed informa-
tion and prevent further use by the breaching party. For the detailed analysis of the elec-
tronic self-help provisions of the UCITA, see Craig Dolly, The Electronic Self-Help
Provisions of the UCITA: A Virtual Repo Man?, 13 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 663 (Spring
2000); Timothy P. Heaton, Electronic Self-Help Software Repossession: A Proposal to Pro-
tect Small Software Development Companies, 6 B. U. J. Sci. & TECH. L. J. 8 (June 1, 2000);
Smith, supra note 12, at 410-412.
126 See Robbin Rahman, Electronic Self-Help Repossession and You: A Computer
Software Vendor's Guide to Staying Out of Jail, 48 EMORY L.J. 1477, 1479-80 (Fall 1999).
Generally, notice to the debtor is not required prior to self-help repossession of collateral
by the creditor upon default, although the provision for self-help repossession has been
held to violate due process requirements in some instances, and states under the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code require particular notice requirements. See 68A Am. Jur. 2d Se-
cured Transactions § 608, at 466 (1993).
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eral upon the debtor' default, the agreement between the parties may
require such notice prior to repossession. 127
The UCITA § 816 restricts the right of a licensor to use electronic
means to prevent use of computer information after material breach
and cancellation of a license.' 28 The restrictions are: (1) a require-
ment of assent in the original agreement to the term regarding availa-
bility of the right; (2) a requirement of no less than 15-day notice
before exercise of the right; (3) a prohibition on any exercise of the
right in certain cases, including any case where there is a threat of
personal injury or severe harm to the public interest; and (4) a non-
waivable right to consequential damages for any wrongful use of elec-
tronic self-help. 129 Some critics of UCITA argue that while the
UCITA self-help provision was a good effort at compromise, it still
suffers from three serious problems: (1) for vendors who legitimately
need help, UCITA's 15-day delay is too long; (2) for customers, the
"backdoor" access into their system poses a security risk; and (3) for
small software licensors, the rules are too technical, preventing the
licensors from appropriate use of self-help remedy even for good-faith
attempts.130
Electronic self-help may be performed in various ways. The first
type utilizes a counter or timer as a disabling device that deactivates
the software once a predetermined limited period or number of uses
has been reached. 13' The second type, referred to as a "time bomb,"
can be used to enforce sanctions for breach of an agreement. 32 The
vendor enters a date, prior to the purchaser's use, that activates the
time bomb, and the device checks that date against the internal calen-
dar in the computer. 133 The third type uses a modem through which
the vendor accesses the purchaser's computer and deactivates the dis-
puted software program.
127 See id.
128 See UCITA § 816.
129 See id.
130 See Ed Foster, Beware of Licensing Terms Giving Vendors the Right to Detonate
Software Bombs at http://www.infoworld.com/cgi-bin/displayNew.pl?/foster/990830ef.htm
(last visited Nov. 15, 2000); Sharon Marsh Roberts & Cern Kaner, Self-help Under UCITA
at http://www.badsoftware.com/shelp.htm (last visited July 23, 1999).
131 See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY: RIGHTS, Li-
CENSES, LIABILITIES, 917.38 (3d ed. 1997).
132 See Esther C. Roditti, Is Self-Help a Lawful Contractual Remedy?, 21 RUTGERS
COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 431, 433 (1995).
133 See Electronic Repossession: It Could Happen To You, PR Newswire, June 11, 1991,
available at LEXIS, PR Newswire File.
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V.
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UCITA AND THE
FEDERAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS
A. Introduction
A provision of the UCITA which is preempted by federal law is
unenforceable to the extent of the preemption. 34 Doctrines grounded
in copyright misuse and other federal law may preclude enforcement
of some contract terms in some cases. The major issue facing UCITA
is whether federal copyright law does (or should) preempt private in-
formation contracts governed by UCITA.135 Here, the relationship be-
tween the UCITA and the federal intellectual property laws will be
examined and more specifically the reverse engineering issue will be
focused on.
"Reverse engineering" has been described simply as a "fair and
honest means .. .of starting with the known product and working
backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture.' '136 In the mechanical world, reverse engineering is sim-
ply the process of taking something apart to determine what makes it
tick. 137 When applied to computer programs, however, reverse engi-
neering becomes more complicated. 38 Thus, the jealously guarded
secrets of the software producer can be discovered by anybody who is
willing, or who has a financial incentive, to go through the process of
reverse engineering. 39 As a result, software producers include -an ex-
press provision prohibiting disassembly or reverse engineering in their
shrinkwrap agreements. 140
134 See UCITA § 105 (a). See also Lewis Bart Stone, The UCITA Revolution, The New
E-Commerce Model for Software and Database Licensing: What Law Applies to Computer
Information Transactions?, 600 PLI/Pat 113, 119 (April-May 2000).
135 See Shah, supra note 124, at 97.
136 Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 476. Generally, software is written in source code form,
which is in a language understandable by humans. The source code may be converted in
any one of several computer languages, such as COBAL, FORTRAN, BASIC, EDL, etc.
See Altai, 982 F.2d at 698. Reverse engineering is necessary for users and developers who
desire to examine the structure and technical parameters of a computer program because
object code or computer language is not intelligible to humans. See Charles R. McManis,
Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer Programs in the
United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 25, 29 (1993).
137 See Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 843, 843 (1994).
138 See id.
139 See Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing
Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569, 573 (1997).
140 See id.
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B. The UCITA and the Copyright Law
Courts have carved out a limited "fair use" exception to an action
for copyright infringement based on copying necessarily involved in
the process of reverse engineering because the ideas embedded in
computer programs may not otherwise be ascertainable. 141 While
older decisions refused to recognize a right to reverse engineer,1 42
modern case law clearly authorizes it under certain circumstances.14 3
No case, however, holds that there is a universal right to reverse engi-
neer for any purpose or in all circumstances. 44 Therefore, while the
public generally may reverse engineer materials in the private domain,
courts, relying on the doctrine of fair use, are able to preserve the
balance between public and private rights to copyrighted works.
C. The UCITA and the Patent Law
After representatives of the patent and trademark licensing com-
munities communicated with the drafters of Article 2B regarding their
concerns about Article 2B's potential to disrupt standard licensing
practices for patents and trademarks, the drafters omitted these trans-
actions from the scope of Article 2B.145 The UCITA still adopts the
same position as did Article 2B. The basic principle is that, if the only
basis for bringing a transaction under Article 2B lies in the existence
of a trademark or patent license, the transaction is not under this Arti-
cle.' 46 The rationale lies in the differences between copyright and dig-
ital licensing and practices in unrelated areas of patent law.147 Patent
licensing relating to biotech, mechanical, and other industries entails
many different assumptions and standard practices that are not incor-
porated in this Article.148 This is also true for trademark licensing.' 49
141 See Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REv. 479, 524-25 (1998).
142 See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983); Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449,
460 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
143 See Bateman v. Mnemonics, Inc., 79 F.3d 1532, 1539 n.18 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding
that reverse engineering a computer program to reveal the unprotectable ideas embedded
in the object code is a fair use); Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832,
843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (same); DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications Inc.,
976 F. Supp. 359, 364 (E.D. Va. 1997) (same); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d 1510, 1527 (1992) (holding that reverse engineering will be considered a fair use if
there is a legitimate reason for reverse engineering, and it is the sole method of gaining
access to the ideas and functional elements embodied in a computer program).
144 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 141, at 525.
145 See Draft of August 1, 1998, § 2B-104(2).
146 See Draft of August 1, 1998, § 2B-104 Reporter's Note 3.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 See id.
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As to trademark licensing, there is the additional consideration of cov-
erage of aspects of that industry under federal and state franchising
laws.150 Thus, a license of a biotechnology patent and associated
know-how, or a license of a trademark as part of a franchise agree-
ment for a popular food store, is not within Article 2B and the
UCITA.15' In the case of the patent, the basic judgment is that the
areas of general patent licensing do not involve the same commercial
law concerns that are central to transactions covered in Article 2B and
the UCITA. 52 In fact, many pure patent licenses are primarily in-
tended to settle or avoid litigation.153 In reference to trademarks, li-
censes often fall under state and federal franchise laws and are
covered by principles unrelated to the commercial issues treated
here.154
Theoretically, reverse engineering of a patented matter is irrele-
vant because patent law explicitly mandates that protection be
granted only upon disclosure of the invention to the public.15 5 The
reverse engineering of a patented program, however, may be neces-
sary for a number of reasons. Although those who do not disclose a
program's code risk losing patent protection for that aspect of their
program,156 patent disclosure requirements do not mandate that the
source code of the patented program be disclosed.' 57 Additionally, re-
verse engineering may be needed to gain access to unpatented compo-
nents of the program or to discover information not disclosed in
sufficient detail. 158 Therefore, if undertaken for the purposes of com-
patibility, competition, or study, as long as the reverse engineer does
not use the discovered knowledge to make, use, or sell the patented
product, it is likely that the mere act of reverse engineering does not
constitute patent infringement. 159 Thus, the balance between public
and private rights is also preserved under the patent laws. While the
public may reverse engineer a patented program to learn about it and
build upon the ideas embedded therein, if the reverse engineer uses
150 See id.
151 See Draft of August 1, 1998, § 2B-103 Reporter's Note 3-c.
152 See id.
153 See id.
154 See id.
155 See 35 U.S.C. § 112.
156 See Mark A. Lemley & David W. O'Brien, Encouraging Software Reuse, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 255, 295 n.259 (1997).
157 See Robotic Vision Sys., Inc. v. View Eng'g, Inc., 112 F.3d 1163, 1166 (Fed. Cir.
1997); Lawrence D. Graham & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., Economically Efficient Treatment of
Computer Software: Reverse Engineering, Protection, and Disclosure, 22 RUTGERS COM-
PUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 96-97 (1996).
158 See Lemley & McGowan, supra note 141, at 524 n.195.
159 See Graham & Zerbe, supra note 157, at 99.
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the knowledge acquired to make, use, or sell a replica of the patented
program, the statutory rights of the private owner will be infringed. 160
With respect to the distinction of warranty between a patent li-
cense and a UCITA license, a patent license does not warrant that the
licensee can use the licensed technology, but merely affirms that the
licensor will not sue for use of its rights. On the other hand, if a party
licenses computer information, the UCITA § 401(a) warranty is
breached if the information as delivered infringes a third party's pat-
ent. If a licensor gives a license to the patent itself, § 401(a) does not
apply.
D. The UCITA and the Trade Secret Law
Although reverse engineering is not explicitly permitted under
the federal copyright and patent statutes, the act of reverse engineer-
ing alone is not likely to constitute infringement. 161 Moreover, re-
verse engineering has long been considered a legal means of
discovering a trade secret. 162 Trade secret protection, standing alone,
cannot protect against the reverse engineering of a product by com-
petitors. 163 Thus, to preserve trade secret protection for computer
source code, it was necessary for manufacturers to take security mea-
sures beyond simply distributing the program in object code form,
such as password access and encryption. 64 Now, because an indispen-
sable provision in any shrinkwrap license is a prohibition on reverse
engineering, if shrinkwrap licenses are enforceable, the delicate bal-
ance has been shattered. This is because the public's right to access
the ideas embedded in computer programs is wholly circumscribed by
private legislation. 165
CONCLUSION
Computers will play an ever-expanding role in the lives of people
in the generations to come. It is in the interests of both software pro-
160 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
161 See Mahajan, supra note 42, at 3315.
162 See id.
163 See, e.g., Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1293 (5th Cir. 1970) (holding
that it is not a misappropriation to discover a trade secret by reverse engineering); Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition 43 (1995) ("Independent discovery and analysis of
publicly available products or information are not improper means of acquisition.").
164 See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders in a Virtual
World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 612-13 (1998).
165 See Madison, supra note 10, at 1130. If reverse engineering is forbidden by contract,
software developers may be granted de facto monopolies over ideas, processes, and sys-
tems that have not met the standards for copyright or patent protection. See DSC Commu-
nications Corp. v. Pulse Communications Inc., 976 F. Supp. 359, 364 (E.D. Va. 1997).
UNIFORM COMPUTER ACT
ducers and the public that the level of proprietary protection afforded
computer programs be determined and clearly demarcated. The mass
marketing of computer software has induced software producers and
vendors to replace negotiated contracts with shrinkwrap licensing
agreements. Although these licenses were initially considered to be
unenforceable contracts, the modern trend has been to enforce the
licenses as valid contracts under the UCC and, in a near future, under
the UCITA. With the development of on-line software distribution,
the creation of shrinkwrap licensing agreements has become relatively
easy. The ease with which enforceable shrinkwrap licenses can be cre-
ated through state contract law has put a greater emphasis on the role
of federal copyright law preemption regarding, e.g., reverse engineer-
ing of a copyrighted software. As indicated by its name, UCITA's pri-
mary goal is to create a uniform body of law to govern all computer
information transactions irrespective of state boundaries. However,
federal preemption could place the coherency of UCITA's entire re-
gime in doubt, leaving the possibility of a fragmented contract frame-
work that still varies from state to state. In addition, although the
UCITA provides the cost-free return right, the current practice in the
software retail industry is not to accept any returns of software once
the shrinkwrap has been opened. 166 Unless these concerns are care-
fully addressed, we may be stuck with an unworkable piece of legisla-
tion guiding a budding and valuable industry in the wrong direction.
166 Major software retailers that follow this practice include CompUSA, Circuit City,
Wal Mart, Office Depot, Dell Computers, and Midwest Micro. See Jennifer L. Hawkins,
Pro CD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licenses Under the Copyright Act,
3 RICH. J.L. TECH. 6, fns 115 & 116 (1997).
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